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THE "MAGIC LANTERN" REVEALED:
A REPORT OF THE FBI'S NEW "KEY
LOGGING" TROJAN AND ANALYSIS
OF ITS POSSIBLE TREATMENT IN A
DYNAMIC LEGAL LANDSCAPE
"You already have zero privacy anyway. Get over it."' Although
this quip from Sun Microsystems CEO Scott McNealy seems extreme, it
strongly illustrates the current tension between the power of technology
and an individual's expectation of privacy. 2 This tension creates an incessant struggle, because for power of surveillance technology to increase, privacy must decrease, and vice versa. These struggles are best
illustrated through the Federal Government's attempts to maintain national security through surveillance of communications and activities
while attempting to sustain the legitimate expectations of privacy in the
American people. 3 One of the most recent developments resulting from
this quandary is the FBI's new enigmatic surveillance tool-a "keystroke
logger" Trojan horse/computer worm they have dubbed "Magic
4
Lantern."
This surveillance tool was created to battle all crimes that utilize
technology and information, especially crimes associated with terrorism
to effectuate illegitimate ends. 5 Recent events have escalated the importance of "cyber intelligence" and have shifted the focus to domestic affairs in order to dispose of "sleeper cells," that is "small groups that live
legally in the U.S. for years poised to [eventually] conduct terrorist attacks."6 Historically, the FBI has been thwarted by certain counter-in1. Richard P. Cambell, Addressing Myriad Issues of Privacy, 23 Natl. L.J. C24 911
(Aug. 6, 2001) (quoting Sun Microsystems CEO Scott McNealy, as he spoke to a group of
reporters in 1999).
2. Id.
3. Id.
4. Dan Verton, CNN.com, Feds Boost Online Surveillance Activity % 1 <http://www.
cnn.com/2001,TECH/internet/12/llonline.surveillance.idg/index.html> (Dec. 11, 2001).
5. Id. at 912. See generally MSNBC Staff and Wire Reports, FBI Confirms 'Magic
Lantern' Exists <http://www.msnbc.com/news/671981.asp> (Dec. 11, 2001).
6. Verton, supra n. 4, at T 2.
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telligence technologies, specifically encryption. 7 Magic Lantern would
assist the FBI by recording the passwords used to encode/decode the encrypted messages, thereby permitting the Bureau to access the content of
the otherwise indecipherable documents. 8 However, critics of the
software raise serious concerns about the software's conflict with current
laws, the Fourth Amendment, 9 and the public's reasonable expectation
of privacy. 1 0
Magic Lantern surfaced publicly in late November, 2001.11 It is reported to have the capability to travel to a specific target via the Internet
(e.g., e-mail) disguised as a Trojan horse/computer virus and install itself
on the targeted personal computer and begin recording the keys typed on
that computer. 12 The subject line of the Magic Lantern e-mail would encourage the user to open it - probably appearing as a note from family or
friends. 13 Indeed, reports convey that "the recipient wouldn't even need
to open the e-mail to install the file. So long as it lands in a mailbox, it
15
can report." 14 However, due to the secretive nature of the software,
there is still a great degree of uncertainty regarding whether the program "would transmit keystrokes it records back to the FBI over the Internet or store the information to be seized later in a raid."16 Some
sources speculate that "Magic Lantern is a derivative of the Data Inter7. See generally Bob Port, FBI's New Weapon a Lot Like a Virus, N.Y. Daily News
(Dec. 25, 2001) (available in 2001 WL 27307798). The FBI has stated that "encryption can
pose potentially insurmountable challenges to law enforcement when used in conjunction
with communication or plans for executing serious terrorist and criminal acts." Associated
Press, FBI Building 'Magic Lantern' To Monitor Computer Use, Dow Jones International
News 7 (Nov. 22, 2001) (available in WL 11/22/01 Dow Jones Int'l News 01:55:00) [hereinafter FBI Building].
8. See generally Port, supra n. 7. As a keystroke logger, Magic Lantern would be able
to exploit "the weakness of any encryption system- when the message is being typed.".
Matthew Fordahl, Anonymous email Service Still RunningAfter Sept. 11, Associated Press
Newswires
32 (Dec. 8, 2001) (available in WL, 12/8/01 APWIRES 15:46:00).
9. U.S. Const. amend. IV.
10. See generally Bob Sullivan, MSNBC.com, FBI Software Cracks Encryption Wall
<http:/www.msnbc.com/news/660096.aspcpl=l> (Nov. 20, 2001).
11. See generally id.
12. MSNBC, FBI Confirms, supra n. 5, at 5. A Trojan horse is "a security-breaking
program disguised as a benign program, such as a directory utility, game or email ....
Viruses and worms infect host computers after being downloaded by the user. Both programs can reproduce and spread. A worm can spread automatically over the network from
one computer to the next." John McElwaine, Cyber Attacks, 13 Feb. S.C. Lawyer 20, 22
(2002).
13. David Crocker, Magic Lantern: Not the Name of an Opera 2 <http://www.inter
facenow.com/column.taf> (Dec. 21, 2001).
14. Id.
15. MSNBC, FBI Confirms, supra n. 5, at 2. FBI spokesman Paul Bresson stated
that "we can't discuss [Magic Lantern] because it's under development." Id. at
3.
16. FBI Building, supra n. 7, at 1 10.
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ception by Remote Transmission ("DIRT") program developed by
Codexdatasystems." 17 If that speculation is correct, the reports imply
that recorded keystrokes would be transmitted to the FBI and not stored
for a later raid.' 8 Other early reports support the "transmission"
rumor.19

Although the existence of this software may seem implausible to
many, according to some reports, "key loggers" have already been in use
for a little over three years. 20 "Companies use keystroke loggers quite
legally to keep an eye on their employees' behavior. Parents use them to
monitor their children's activities online."2 ' However, it is reported that
the main purpose of Magic Lantern is to record passwords that the
targets use to operate encryption software. 22 This encryption software
scrambles incoming/outgoing messages with a complex code that the FBI
previously has had great difficulties overcoming. 23 So although
[e]ncryption keys are unbreakable by brute force... the keys themselves
are only protected by the passphrase used to start the [encryption program]. If [the] agents can obtain that passphrase while typed into a
computer by its owner, they can obtain the suspect's encryption keysimilar to obtaining a key to a lock box which
contains a piece of paper
24
that includes the combination for a safe.
Magic Lantern presents several difficult legal questions that are left
unanswered due to new or non-existent statutes and case law directly
pertaining to the unique situation that Magic Lantern creates. 25 The
17. Crocker, supra n. 13, at 2.
18. Id.
19. See generally Port, supra n. 7. "Magic Lantern is a program that records each
keystroke made on a target computer and transmits that data to the bureau." Id. at $ 4;
MSNBC, FBI Confirms supra n. 5, at 5. "Magic Lantern would allow the agency to gain
that information without having to gain physical access to the computer." Id.
20. See Robert Lemos, CNET News.com, FBI Snoop Tool Old Hat for Hackers 911
<http://news.cnet.com/news/0-1003-200-7944351.html?tag=prntfr> (Nov. 21, 2000). "Several hacking tools, the two most popular being Back Orifice and SubSeven, allow full control over a remote PC infected by the program, including keystroke logging and even
recording a conversation if a microphone is connected to the PC. Both programs have been
incorporated into Trojan horses and are several years old." Id. at 1 11.
21. David Coursey, Keep Yourself Top Secret! How to Defeat Spyware (Part2) 1 2 (Jan.
3, 2002) (available in 2002 WL 5880066).
22. See Sullivan, supra n. 10, at 9110. Reportedly, Magic Lantern will watch "for a
suspect to start a[n]. . encryption program... It then logs the passphrase used to start the
program, essentially giv[ing] agents access to keys needed to decrypt files." Id.
23. See Port, supra n. 7, at 91$ 13-15. "Encrypted email has bedeviled the FBI for
years." Id. at 1 14. See Jovi Tanada Yam, Lawyer.com Worst Tech Product of 2001? (Dec.
27, 2001) (available in 2001 WL 31372969). "The FBI has always fretted openly about
encryption technology's ability to help criminals and terrorists hide their work in the dark."
Id. at T 7.
24. Sullivan, supra n. 10, at T 11.
25. See generally Lemos, supra n. 20.
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first concern is statutory. It is unclear what laws, if any, will apply when
Magic Lantern is put into use. 2 6 The recent terrorist attacks in the
United States have brought the need for information as a matter of national security to the forefront. Congress recently passed legislation (i.e.
USA PATRIOT Act) 2 7 that dramatically modifies current surveillance
law, thus further complicating the untested waters of a new surveillance
method with an undeveloped statutory scheme that would potentially
regulate that method. 28 In addition, it is uncertain whether Magic Lantern can legally operate under the authority of a search warrant, requiring a relatively low burden of proof, or whether it will have to obtain a
29
wiretap, with a high burden of proof, in order to conduct surveillance.
The second concern is constitutional. If the FBI only obtained authorization to record a certain kind of information, and the keystroke
logger recorded every keystroke entered by the target whether it regarded the information sought or not, then it is possible that the
software could result in overly broad searches in violation of the Fourth
30
Amendment.
By considering the only recorded case dealing with a technology similar to Magic Lantern, Section I of this comment will develop the dynamic legal environment Magic Lantern is entering, as well as outline a
sister software to Magic Lantern, also created by the FBI, that was
known as "Carnivore." 3 1 Section II of this comment analyzes the constitutional questions Magic Lantern presents within the context of the
Fourth Amendment. 32 It focuses the possible violations of search and
seizure, invasion of privacy, and over-broad searches. 3 3 Section III explores the statutes that might apply to Magic Lantern and discusses the
new niche that the software has carved, for it does not clearly fit into
many of the laws that deal with electronic surveillance. 3 4 Specifically,
Section III will examine such statutes as the Electronic Communications
Privacy Act ("ECPA"), 3 5 the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act
26. Id. at 17.
27. See infra Part IIIC.1 for further discussion.
28. See generally Stefanie Olsen, CNET News.com, PatriotAct Draws Privacy Concerns <http://news.cnet.com/news/0-1005-200-7671240.html?tag=prntfr>) (Oct. 26, 2001);
see infra Parts III.B., IIIC for further discussion.
29. See generally U.S. v. Scarfo, 180 F. Supp. 2d 572 (D.N.J. Dec. 26, 2001); see
Crocker, supra n. 13, at 5.
30. See Sullivan, supra n. 10, at
14-16.
31. Crocker, supra n. 13, at 2.
32. U.S. Const. amend. IV.
33. Id.
34. 18 U.S.C.S. §§ 2510-2520, 2701-2709 (Lexis L. Publg. 2001); 50 U.S.C.S. §§ 1801 et.
seq. (Lexis L. Publg. 2001); Pub. L. No. 107-56, 2001 H.R. 3162 (2001).
35. 18 U.S.C.S. §§ 2510-2520, 2701-2709.
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("FISA"), 36 the USA PATRIOT Act, 37 and others that might substantially bear on the use of Magic Lantern. Section IV briefly confronts the
practical dilemmas that Magic Lantern faces, such as its coexistence
with anti-virus software programs and its foreign government quagmire. 38 Section V attempts to resolve the ambiguities surrounding
Magic Lantern and suggests how Magic Lantern will be treated in the
future.
I.

UNITED STATES v. SCARFO AND THE FBI'S SPYWARE
KNOWN AS "CARNIVORE." MAGIC LANTERN'S TWO
CLOSEST RELATIVES.

Presently, there is no case that deals explicitly with key-logging
software that operates in the exact fashion of Magic Lantern, specifically
a technology that is planted via the Internet on a target's computer disguised as a Trojan/virus, and transmits data back to the FBI. 39 However, on December 26, 2001 the District Court for the District of New
Jersey passed judgment in a case of first impression involving another
form of key-logging technology used by the FBI. 40 In United States v.
Scarfo, the district court denied a challenge to the introduction of evidence that was obtained with assistance from a key-logger system physically installed on the defendant's computer. 4 1 The opinion discusses
many of the issues that will apply to the use of Magic Lantern, including
a possible over-collection of data that would mandate a general warrant
that is violative of the Fourth Amendment 4 2 and whether the Key Log43
ger System ("KLS") intercepted wire communications.
In Scarfo, the FBI, "acting pursuant to federal search warrants," entered Nicodemo S. Scarfo's business office "to search for evidence of an
illegal gambling and loansharking operation." 44 They searched Scarfo's
personal computer, but could not access certain encrypted files, which
45
they suspected contained the evidence for which they were searching.
36. 50 U.S.C.S. §§ 1801 et. seq.
37. See generally Uniting and StrengtheningAmerica by ProvidingAppropriate Tools
Required to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-56, 2001 H.R.
3162 (2001) [hereinafter USA PATRIOT Act].
38. Crocker, supra n. 13, at 3.
39. Id. at 2.
40. Scarfo, 180 F. Supp. 2d at 574. "It appears that no district court in the country has
addressed a similar issue." Id.
41. Id. "This case presents an interesting issue of first impression dealing with the
ever-present tension between individual privacy and liberty rights and law enforcement's
use of new and advanced technology to vigorously investigate criminal activity." Id.
42. Id. at 576; U.S. Const. amend. IV.
43. Scarfo, 180 F. Supp. 2d at 574-75.
44. Id. at 574.
45. Id.
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After obtaining two search warrants,
the F.B.I. returned to the location,... and installed what is known as a

'Key Logger System' ('KLS') on the computer and/or computer keyboard
in order to decipher the passphrase to the encrypted file, thereby gaining entry to the file. The KLS records the
keystrokes an individual en46
ters on a personal computer's keyboard.
The KLS then recorded the passphrases to the encrypted file as
Scarfo typed them, consequently giving the FBI access to "what [was]
47
alleged to be incriminating evidence."
After Scarfo was indicted, "he filed [a] motion for discovery and to
suppress the evidence recovered from his computer," 48 alleging that the
"KLS constituted an unlawful general warrant in violation of the Fourth
Amendment" and that it "effectively intercepted a wire communication
in violation of [ECPA] Title III, 18 U.S.C. § 2510." 49 The trial judge, after being exposed to all of the functions of the key-logger, 50 rejected
Scarfo's claim that "the warrants were written and executed as general
warrants.. .", primarily based on the theory that although the key-logger
may record some information not prevalent to the criminal investigation,
"no tenet of the Fourth Amendment prohibits a search merely because it
cannot be performed with surgical precision."5 1 The discussion on general warrants and the Fourth Amendment 5 2 in this case will be included
and analyzed in detail in Section II of this comment.
Addressing Scarfo's statutory argument, the judge stated that "the
principal mystery surrounding this case was whether the KLS inter46. Id.
47. Id.
48. Id.

49. Id. at 576. The defendant's also challenged the court's ruling concerning the government's discovery procedures and invocation of the Classified Information Procedures
Act, 18 U.S.C. app. III §§ 1 et seq. (1980). Id. at 575.
50. Id. at 574. The government claimed shelter under the act after refusing to comply
with a court order to submit a report "explaining fully how the KLS device functions and
describing the KLS technology and how it works vis-A-vis the computer modem, Internet
communications, email and all other uses of a computer." Id. at 575. The government then
submitted a modified brief claiming that "disclosure of the KLS would jeopardize both
ongoing and future domestic criminal investigations and national security interests." Id.
After the court held an in camera,ex parte hearing where the FBI presented the court with
"detailed and top-secret, classified information regarding the KLS, including how it operates in connection with a modem," the court found that "the government made a sufficient
showing to warrant the issuance of an order protecting against the disclose of the classified
information." Id. The issues of national security, evidence in criminal trials, and the application of the Classified Information Procedures Act will more than likely apply to Magic
Lantern as well, due to the software's classified and developmental status. See generally
MSNBC, FBI Confirms, supra n. 5.

51. Scarfo, 180 F. Supp. 2d at 578 (quoting U.S. v. Conley, 4 F.3d 1200, 1208 (3d Cir.
1993) (quoting U.S. v. Christine, 687 F.2d 749, 760 (3d Cir. 1982))).
52. U.S. Const. amend. IV.
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cepted a wire communication in violation of the wiretap statute by recording keystrokes of e-mail or other communications made over a
telephone or cable line while the modem operated." 53 The judge limited
the inquiry as such because "[tihese are the only conceivable wire communications which might emanate from Scarfo's computer and potentially fall under the wiretap statute."54 The judge went on to rule that
"upon a careful and through review of the classified information provided
... the KLS technique... did not intercept any wire communications and
therefore did not violate the wiretap statute."5 5 Section III of this comment will further expound upon the ECPA 56 , the role it played in
Scarfo57 , and how it might apply to Magic Lantern. In explaining why
the KLS didn't violate the ECPA,58 the judge stated, "I am satisfied that
the KLS did not operate during any period of time in which the computer's modem was activated." 59 The judge relied primarily on reports
from the FBI that stated the software was configured to intentionally
avoid "real time" interception of communication transmitted via the Internet.60 The judge's ruling hinged on this decision, and "[a]ccordingly,
the defendant's motion to suppress evidence for violation of Title III
[was] denied." 6 1 Section III of this comment will further expound upon
the ECPA, the role it played in Scarfo, and how it might apply to Magic
Lantern.
Although the Scarfo6 2 decision sets strong precedent for Magic Lantern, the case still leaves numerous stones unturned. The case gives good
insight into how Magic Lantern will be treated by the courts if Magic
Lantern, like the Key Logger System used in Scarfo, does not report any
information that entered or exited through the modem. 63 However, as
previously reported, it seems probable that Magic Lantern will transmit
its information over the Internet; the remaining details of the software
are either being developed or treated as classified. 64 Such fine threads
are subject to close judicial scrutiny when put within the context of statutory interpretation. Section II and Section III will explore these issues
further.
53.
54.
55.
56.
57.
58.
59.
60.
61.
62.
63.
64.

Scarfo, 180 F. Supp. 2d at 581.
Id.
Id.
18 U.S.C.S. §§ 2510-2520, 2701-2709.
Scarfo, 180 F. Supp. 2d at 581.
18 U.S.C.S. §§ 2510-2520, 2701-2709.
Id. See infra Section III and accompanying text.
Scarfo, 180 F. Supp. 2d at 581.
Id. at 582.
See id.
Id. at 581.
See MSNBC, FBI Confirms, supra n. 5, at 1 1.
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Although Scarfo6 5 was the first case to deal with Key Logging technology, Key Logging technology was not the first technology that the FBI
66
has employed for electronic communication surveillance purposes.
"Last year, the FBI touched off a furor with its use of e-mail monitoring
technology known as Carnivore." 67 The software, now known as DCS
1000,68 is a system used "to implement court-ordered surveillance of
electronic communication. It is used when other implementations... do
not meet the needs of the investigators or the restrictions placed by the
court."6 9 Magic Lantern and Carnivore are similar in that they both record electronic information and report back to the FBI. 70 However, their
differences may greatly affect their statutory treatment. In order to use
Carnivore, the FBI must get permission according to the ECPA (Title III
of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act) 7 1 or the FISA7 2 to
place a wiretap on the communications carrier, usually an Internet Service Provider or "ISP" such as AOL or CompuServe. 7 3 Because the use of
Carnivore requires a wiretap order which is more difficult to obtain than
a general search warrant, when Carnivore is put into action "[1]aw enforcement agents follow a rigorous, detailed procedure to obtain court
orders and surveillance is performed under the supervision of the court
issuing the order." 74 The Carnivore "clearance process" illustrates well
how the wiretap/general search warrant distinction will prove critical in
to
determining what kind of authority law enforcement officials will have
75
gain in order to implement Magic Lantern on a target's computer.
Like Magic Lantern, Carnivore has also been the subject of much
criticism and concern relating to its invasive nature and Constitutional
65. Scarfo, 180 F. Supp. 2d at 574.
66. See generallyWilliam Matthews, Federal Computer Week, FBI's Key Logger Under
(Aug. 9,
Scrutiny <http://www.fcw.com/fcw/articles/2001/0813/news-fbi-08-13-O1.asp>
2001).
67. Id. at 13.
68. Lemos, supra n. 20, at 9115.
69. Thomas Gregory Motta, Government and Electronic Privacy: Trends in Law Enforcement, Investigatory Tools and Protection of National Security, 632 PLI/PAT 631, 642
(Jan. 2001).
70. Crocker, supra n. 13, at T12.
71. 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510-22 (2001).
72. 50 U.S.C. §§ 1801-29 (2001).
73. See Motta, supra n. 69, at 654. "The FBI is placing a black box inside the computer
network of an ISP." Id. See Eric Manton M. Grier, Jr., Student Author, The Software
Formerly Known As "Carnivore":When Does Email Surveillance Encroach Upon a Reasonable Expectation of Privacy?, 52 S.C. L. Rev. 875 (2001). "It is the FBI's latest email surveillance technology-a software program housed in a computer unit and attached to an
Internet Service Provider, such as American Online." Id.
74. See Motta, supra n. 69, at 642.
75. Scarfo, 180 F. Supp. 2d at 578.
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validity, 76 specifically in the environment of over broad searches.7 7 So,
although Magic Lantern and Carnivore are substantially different electronic surveillance devices that likely will be treated differently7 8 under
respectively applicable statutes, in some aspects their fates could be
intertwined.
II.

THE CONSTITUTIONAL IMPLICATIONS OF
MAGIC LANTERN.

"There is no provision in the United States Constitution that specifically establishes or enumerates a general right to privacy. Notwithstanding, there are several provisions of the Bill of Rights or First Ten
Amendments to the U.S. Constitution that imply.. .aspects of privacy
79
protection in the context of the amendment."
The specific component of the Constitution which most relates to
Magic Lantern is the Fourth Amendment.8 0 The Fourth Amendment
grants to the people the right "to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures, [and that
those rights] shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon
probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly
describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be
seized."8 1 As a threshold question, whether Magic Lantern is going to
implicate the Fourth Amendment will turn, then, on whether its consequent recording of keystrokes and transmission of data back to the FBI
qualifies as a "search and seizure" under the meaning of the
82
amendment.
"In determining whether a particular form of government initiated
electronic surveillance is a 'search' within the meaning of the Fourth
84
Amendment, [the court's] lodestar is Katz v. United States."83 In Katz,
the FBI attached an electronic listening and recording device to a public
telephone booth, recorded the contents of conversations and entered the
dialogue into evidence against the speaker.8 5 The FBI argued that there
76. See e.g. Sullivan, supra n. 10, at
14. See generally William Mathews, Federal
Computer Week, Senate OK's Easier Use of Carnivore <http://www.fcw.com/fcw/articles/
2001/0917/news-fbi-09-17-01.asp> (Sept. 17, 2001). "Critics have labeled Carnivore a
sweeping invasion of privacy" Id. at 4.
77. See generally id.
78. See Sullivan, supra n. 10, at 1 7,8.
79. Eugene J. Yannon, Privacy Law, 34 Md. B.J. 24, 27 (NovJDec. 2001)
80. U.S. Const. amend. IV.
81. Id.
82. See id.
83. Smith v. Md., 442 U.S. 735 (1979) (citing Katz v. U.S., 389 U.S. 347 (1967)).
84. Katz, 389 U.S. at 347.
85. Id. at 348.
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could be no violation of the Fourth Amendment "because '[t]here was no
physical entrance into the area occupied by, [Katz].'"86 The Court rejected this "physical" test used to determine whether a "search" had occurred, replacing it with a new test that rested on an individual's
reasonable "expectation of privacy."8 7 The Court outlined the test by
presenting two requirements that must be met before a citizen may properly invoke the Fourth Amendment.8 8 The first is "that a person have
exhibited an actual (subjective) expectation of privacy and, second, that
the expectation be one that society is prepared to recognize as
'reasonable.'" 8 9
Using the "reasonable expectation of privacy"90 test, the Court held,
specifically that "a person in a telephone booth may rely upon the protection of the Fourth Amendment. One who occupies [a telephone booth],
shuts the door behind him, and pays the toll. . is surely entitled to assume that the words he utters into the mouthpiece will not be broadcast
to the world."9 1 Using this logic, the Court held that "[t]he Government's
activities in electronically listening to and recording the petitioner's
words violated the privacy upon which he justifiably relied while using
the telephone booth and thus constituted a 'search and seizure' within
92
the meaning of the Fourth Amendment."
The test developed in Katz9 3 as applied to Magic Lantern poses an
interesting question that courts must eventually answer: Does an individual have a reasonable expectation of privacy in the keystrokes that he
enters into his computer? Keystrokes are used to compose e-mails, type
"real-time" messages over an "instant messenger," and-at the heart of
the matter-type passwords, which, by their nature necessitate secrecy.
Considering this, there appears to be a strong presupposition that an
individual has a reasonable expectation of privacy in the keystrokes
94
made while using a computer.
However, in Smith v. Maryland95 the Supreme Court, using the test
86. Id. at 349.
87. Id. at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring). "[T]he Fourth Amendment protects people, not
places." Id. at 351.
88. Id. at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring).
89. Id.
90. Id. at 351.
91. Id. at 352.
92. Id. at 353.
93. See generally id.
94. Id.
95. See generally Smith, 442 U.S. 735. In Smith, the police used a pen register to trace
the calls of a man suspected of robbery. Id. They "did not get a warrant or court order
before having the pen register installed." Id. at 737. The suspect was subsequently arrested and in a pretrial motion and in a pretrial motion "sought to suppress 'all fruits de-
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developed in Katz, 9 6 held that the installation and use of a pen register
("a mechanical device that records the numbers dialed on a telephone by
monitoring the electrical impulses caused when the dial on the telephone
is released" 9 7) did not violate an individual's "reasonable expectation of
privacy."9 8 Consequently, "the installation and use of a pen register... was not a "search" [for the purposes of the Fourth Amendment]
and no warrant was required."99 The Court in Smith' 0 0 distinguished
pen registers from the device used in Katz by pointing out that "pen registers do not acquire the contents of communications." 1° 1 Providing support for the conclusion that pen registers do not violate a reasonable
expectation of privacy, the Court doubted "that people in general entertain any actual expectation of privacy in the numbers they dial. All telephone users realize that they must 'convey' phone numbers to the
telephone company, since it is through telephone company switching
equipment that their calls are completed." 10 2 The Court went on to say
that "although subjective expectations cannot be scientifically gauged, it
is too much to believe that telephone subscribers, under these circumstances, harbor any general expectation that the numbers they dial will
10 3
remain secret."
Although the Court concluded in Smith' 0 4 that a pen register, which
is a device similar to Magic Lantern, in that they both record the pushing
of buttons and keystrokes, did not violate an individual's reasonable expectation of privacy, the Supreme Courts' decision only further serves to
support Magic Lantern's presupposition supported by Katz' 05 -that an
individual has a reasonable expectation of privacy in the keystrokes
made while using a computer.' 0 6 Smith' 0 7 noted the difference between
surveillance devices that trace and ones that record content, holding that
the use of content recording technologies is more likely to be seen as violating a "reasonable expectation of privacy."' 0 8 The Court went so far as
to assert that "the broad and unsuspected governmental incursions into
rived from the pen register' on the ground that the police had failed to secure a warrant
prior to its instillation." Id. at 738.
96. See generally Katz, 389 U.S. 347.
97. Id. at 736 (quoting U.S. v. N.Y. Tel. Co., 434 U.S. 159, 161 n. 1 (1977)).
98. Smith, 442 U.S. at 745-46.
99. Id.
100. Id. at 746.
101. Id. at 741.
102. Id. at 742.
103. Id. at 743.
104. See generally id.
105. See generally Katz, 389 U.S. 347.
106. See generally Smith, 442 U.S. 735.
107. Id. at 741.

108. Id.
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conversational privacy which electronic surveillance entails necessitate
the application of Fourth Amendment safeguards." x0 9 Magic Lantern
most likely will be classified as a "content" recorder: the keys are used to
compose words (passwords) and sentences.1 10 Although, due to the publicity of cookies, spyware, and the like, the public in general might expect
that companies, individuals, and the government might be monitoring
their internet connection, it seems unlikely that the public would expect
or have knowledge that the keystrokes they used to compose their financial information, private digital diaries, and their passwords are being
recorded by the government."- Assuming that, at the very least, Magic
Lantern records passwords, and applying the rationale used by the
Courts in Smith 112 and Katz, 1 1 3 it appears likely that, when Magic Lantern is put into use by the FBI, the recorded keystrokes will be seen as a
"search" under the meaning of the Fourth Amendment, 1 14 and, consequently, the FBI must follow the appropriate statutory procedure in order to obtain authority for its use.
The issue, it seems, will be left to the courts. The only case on sufficiently on point to provide guidance is United States v. Scarfo.1 15 However, the issue of whether the KLS is a "search and seizure" for purposes
of the Fourth Amendment was not addressed in Scarfo1 16 because the
1 17
FBI obtained a search warrant to use the KLS on Scarfo's computer.
The issue in Scarfo's case then became whether the warrants authorizing
the use of KLS were general warrants violative of the Fourth Amendment because "the government had the ability to capture and record only
those keystrokes relevant to the 'passphrase' to the encrypted file, and
11 8
because it received an unnecessary over-collection of data[.]"
Once an activity is deemed to be a "search" within the meaning of
the Fourth Amendment, law enforcement officers must then obtain a
search warrant to proceed with the activity. 119 "Where a search warrant
109. Id. at 746.
110. Crocker, supra n. 13, at 912.
111. See generally In re DoubleClick Inc. Privacy Litigation, 154 F. Supp. 2d 497, 507
(S.D.N.Y. 2001). "Cookies are computer programs commonly used by Web sites to store
useful information such as usernames, passwords, and preferences, making it easier for
users to access Web pages in an efficient manner." Id. at 502, 503. Websites typically
"store this information on the users hard drive" until the websites administrators "access
the cookies and [upload] the data." Id. at 503.
112. Smith, 442 U.S. 735.
113. Katz, 389 U.S. 347.
114. U.S. Const. amend. IV.
115. See generally Scarfo, 180 F. Supp. 2d 572.
116. Id.
117. Id. at 574. "[T]he F.B.I. returned to the location and, pursuant to two search warrants, installed what is known as a "Key Logger System" ("KLS") on the computer" Id.
118. Id. at 576.
119. See generally Johnson v. U.S., 68 S. Ct. 367 (1948).
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is obtained, the Fourth Amendment requires a certain modicum of particularity in the language of the warrant with respect to the area and
items to be searched and/or seized." 120 The court in Scarfo stated that
"[tihe particularity requirement exists so that law enforcement officers
a boundless and exploratory rummagare constrained from undertaking
12 1
ing through one's property."
The ruling in Scarfo that the KLS did not violate the Fourth Amendment 122 could prove important to the legal treatment of Magic Lantern
concerning general warrants because it appears that for the purposes of
the Fourth Amendment, the two technologies perform analogous, and
nearly identical functions. 1 23 Both technologies run the risk of performing "over broad" searches. 124 In Scarfo, the court focused on the specificity of the search warrant, stating "it is clear that the Court Orders suffer
from no constitutional infirmity with respect to particularity." 12 5 The
court further stated that "[o] n its face, the Order is very comprehensive
and lists the items, including the evidence in the encrypted files, to be
seized with more than sufficient specificity."1 2 6 This statement would
indicate that if the FBI obtained a detailed search warrant or wiretap
order to use Magic Lantern with a comprehensive list of items to be
searched that it would, at least in the view of some courts, withstand a
27
Fourth Amendment general warrant challenge.1
The court goes on to pronounce that the fact that the KLS recorded
keystrokes other "than the searched for passphrase" does "not... convert
the limited search for the passphrase into a general exploratory
search." 1 28 In expounding on the rationale justifying the KLS non-specified interception (and consequently building support for the constitutional use of Magic Lantern), the Scarfo court reasoned that "[diuring
many lawful police searches, police officers may not know the exact na1 29
ture of the incriminating evidence sought until they stumble upon it."
The court then analogized that "[jiust like searches for incriminating
120. Scarfo, 180 F. Supp. 2d at 576 (citing Tores v. McLaughlin, 163 F.3d 169, 173 (3d
Cir. 1988)).
121. Id. (citing U.S. v. Johnson, 690 F.2d 60, 64 (3d Cir. 1982) (citingCoolidge v. N.H.,
403 U.S. 443, 467 (1971))).
122. Scarfo, 180 F. Supp. 2d at 578.
123. See Sullivan, supra n. 10, at 9.
124. Id. at 14.
125. Scarfo, 180 F. Supp. 2d at 577.
126. Id. (citing Andersen v. Md., 427 U.S. 463, 480-81 (1976)). In Andersen, the "defendant's general warrant claim was rejected where [the] search warrant contained, among
other things, a lengthy list of specified and particular items to be seized." Id. (citing Andersen v. Md., 427 U.S. 463, 480-81 (1976)).
127. See generally id.
128. Id. at 578.
129. Id.
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documents in a closet or filing cabinet, it is true that during a search for
a passphrase "some innocuous [items] will be at least cursorily perused
in order to determine whether they are among those [items] to be
seized." 130 Consequently, the court reasoned, "law enforcement officers
must be afforded the leeway to wade through a potential morass of information in the target location to find the particular evidence which is
properly specified in the warrant."13 1 The court then cited to the Supreme Court decision of Anderson v. Maryland13 2 quoting "the complexity of an illegal scheme may not be used as a shield to avoid detection
when the [government] has demonstrated probable cause to believe that
a crime has been committed and probable cause to believe that evidence
of this crime is in the suspect's possession." 13 3 The court then concluded
the KLS were not written and executed as
that the warrants authorizing
34
general warrants.'
The ruling in Scarfo13 5 outlines the legal theory that the FBI must
adhere to if the use of Magic Lantern is going avoid falling into the category of "general warrant."1 3 6 If the FBI obtains a warrant to use Magic
Lantern and the warrant names, with sufficient specificity, the items to
be searched, then following the holding in Scarfo, such a warrant would
13 7
avoid violation of the Fourth Amendment as a general warrant.
Therefore, if Magic Lantern intercepts communications that were not
specifically listed in the warrant, the courts should allow a certain
amount of flexibility in order for the FBI to determine whether the communications are among the items sought.' 38 However, as with the use of
any surveillance tool capable of abuse, if law enforcement officials fail to
stay within the letter of the law regarding the use of Magic Lantern and
begin to abuse their authority, the court's flexibility in acquiescing to an
over-collection of information could quickly expire, making a constitu139
tional use of Magic Lantern both difficult and fruitless.
130. Id. (citing U.S. v. Conley, 4 F.3d 1200, 1208 (3d Cir. 1993)). "[N]o tenet of the
Fourth Amendment prohibits a search merely because it cannot be performed with surgical
precision." (quoting U.S. v. Christine, 687 F.2d 749 (3d Cir. 1982) Id.
131. Scarfo, 180 F. Supp. 2d at 578.
132. Anderson, 427 U.S. at 482.
133. Id. (citingAnderson 427 U.S. at 482).
134. Scarfo, 180 F. Supp. 2d at 578.
135. See generally id.
136. Id. at 576.
137. Id.
138. Id.
139. See generally id. The court in Scarfo ultimately passed judgment on the specifications of the warrant, the technology of the KLS, and the ability of the KLS to remain within
existing law. See generally id. This would seem to indicate that the constitutionality of
Magic Lantern is dependant on the specifications of the warrant, technology, and how it is
put to use. See generally id.
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III.

MAGIC LANTERN AND STATUTORY LAW

The body of statutory law governing surveillance, privacy, and the
Federal government's involvement with interception of electronic communications is massive, cryptic, dynamic and, due to the recent passage
of the USA PATRIOT Act, 14 0 untested. 14 1 It is unclear which laws, if
any, will apply to Magic Lantern once it has been put into use. Arguably,
the determination of which statutes will be deemed applicable to Magic
Lantern will rest on the determination of whether Magic Lantern will be
found legally to "intercept wire communications." 14 2 If Magic Lantern is
deemed to "intercept wire communications," thus classifying it as a
"wiretap," then it will fall under the umbrella of such acts as the
ECPA, 14 3 the FISA of 1978 ,14 and possibly the Uniting and Strengthening America by ProvidingAppropriate Tools Required to Intercept and
Obstruct Terrorism Act ("USA PATRIOT Act").' 4 5 The purpose of this
section is to analyze the language and interpretation of the statutes that
could possible be relevant to Magic Lantern and to analyze the likelihood
of the statute's applicability.
A.

THE ELECTRONIC COMMUNICATIONS PRIVACY ACT

("ECPA") 1 4 6

In 1986, the ECPA "was enacted to amend Title III of the Omnibus
Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968 [also known as the "Federal
Wiretap Act"], which authorized court-ordered government wiretapping."1 4 7 "Court orders described by and issued under the Federal Wiretap Act [that was modified by the ECPAI are known as Title III
warrants." 148 The ECPA protects against unauthorized access, interception, or disclosure of private communications by the government as well
as by individuals and third parties." 14 9 The ECPA is divided into two
parts, "Title I of the ECPA restricts the interception of oral, wire, and
electronic communications while in transit, and Title II pertains to the
140. U.S.A. PATRIOT Act, Pub. L. No., 107-56, 2001 HR 3162.
141. The U.S.A. PATRIOTAct was passed October 26, 2001, and at the time of composition of this comment, no cases had challenged it. See generally id.
142. See generally 18 U.S.C. § 2510 (2001).
143. Electronic CommunicationsPrivacyAct of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-508, 100 Stat. 1851,
1859-1868 (codified as 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510-2522, 2701-2711 (2001)).
144. Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-511, 92 Stat. 1783
(codified as amended at 50 U.S.C. §§ 1801-11863 (1994 & Supp. V 1999)).
145. U.S.A. PATRIOT Act, Pub. L. No., 107-56, 2001 HR 3162.
146. 18 U.S.C.S. §§ 2510-2522, 2701-2711.
147. U.S. v. Reyes, 922 F.Supp. 818, 836 (S.D.N.Y. 1996).
148. Id. at 836 n.18.
149. Susan E. Gindin, Lost and Found in Cyberspace: InformationalPrivacy in the Age
of the Internet, 34 S.D. L. Rev. 1153, 1197 (1997).

302

JOURNAL OF COMPUTER & INFORMATION LAW

[Vol. XX

acquisition and disclosure of stored communications." 1 50 Title I outlaws
the interception of electronic communications and "Title II, also known
as the Stored CommunicationsAct, bars unauthorized "access" to stored
electronic communications." 15 1 Due to the language of the statute and
the novelty of Magic Lantern, it is unclear if either Title I or Title II
would apply to the FBI's most recent surveillance device.
The importance of whether the ECPA (also referred to as "Title
III")152 will govern Magic Lantern when it is put to use lies in the heightened difficulty of obtaining authorization for surveillance under the
ECPA, opposed to the procedure for obtaining a search warrant. 153 "A
surveillance order, the authorization that Congress created for law enforcement to legally conduct a wiretap, bears many similarities to a
search warrant, which it is essentially modeled after." 154 However, the
surveillance order is much more difficult to obtain than a general search
warrant, which only requires probable cause. 155 In order to obtain a sur150. Id. Title I is located in 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510-2521 of the Electronic Communications
Privacy Act of 1986. Title II is located in 18 U.S.C. §§ 2701-2710 of the Electronic Communications Privacy Act of 1986.
151. Recent Case, Federal Statutes-Electronic Communications Privacy Act of 1986Ninth Circuit Holds that the Wiretap Act ProtectsElectronic Communications in Storage to
the Same Extent as Those In Transit.-Konop v. HawaiianAirlines 236 F.3d 1035 (9th Cir.
2001), 114 Harv. L. Rev. 2563, 2563 (2001) [hereinafter Recent Case].
152. The ECPA modified Title III of the Omnibus Crime Controland Safe Streets Act of
1968 (18 U.S.C. §§ 2510-2522). Consequently, the two Acts are referred to in the collective
as "Title III."
153. Melissa J. Annis, U.SA. Attorneys' Bulletin, Electronic Surveillance: Does it Bug
You? (Sept. 1997).
154. Mark G. Young, Student Author, What Big Eyes and Ears You Have!: A New Regime for Covert Governmental Surveillance, 70 Fordham L. Rev. 1017, 1058 (2001).
155. Annis, supra n. 153, at 34.
Congress has outlined very strenuous requirements for the lawful application, interception, and use of electronic surveillance, given the nature of the intrusion in
wire, oral, and electronic interceptions. For example, applications to intercept
communications under Title III must be authorized by the Attorney General, Associate Attorney General, Deputy Attorney General, Assistant Attorney General, or
a Deputy Assistant Attorney General in the Criminal Division of the Department
of Justice [[18 U.S.C.] 2516(1)]. Without the proper authorizations, the evidence
will be suppressed. Search warrants require some specificity, but Title II requires
that an application to intercept communications include: (1) the identity of the
investigative or law enforcement officer submitting the application [§ 2518(1)(a)];
(2) a full and complete statement of the facts relied upon to conclude there is
probable cause [§ 2518(1)(d)]: (3) details as to the alleged offenses [§ 2518(1)(b)];
(4) details as to the nature and location of the facilities from which or where the
communications are to be intercepted [§ 2518(1)(b)]; (5) a particular description of
the type of communications to be intercepted [§ 2518(1)(b)]; (6) the identity of the
persons (if known) committing the offense(s) and the persons whose communications are to be intercepted ("named interceptees") [§ 2518(1)(b)]; (7) a full and complete statement of whether other investigative procedures have been tried and
failed or why they appear unlikely to succeed or are too dangerous to employ
[§ 2 518(1)(c)]; (8) a statement of the period of time for which the interception is to
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veillance order, the application to intercept communications must include an extremely detailed and tailored list of all targets and
communications to be intercepted. 156 In addition, the application must
come from the U.S. Attorney General's office, must be approved by a Federal judge or magistrate, and all other investigative techniques must
have been proven unsuccessful, potentially unsuccessful, or too dangerous. 157 This difficult process illustrates the gravity of the ECPA's applicability to the use of Magic Lantern.
The question of the ECPA's applicability to Magic Lantern will more
than likely hinge on the construction and application of particular definitions within § 2510.158 The terms "wire communication," "intercept,"
"electronic communication," "electronic storage" and "aural transfer" are
of particular and specific importance. 15 9 Section 2511 of the ECPA
criminalizes the interception of any "wire, oral, or electronic communication."16 0 Section 2510 defines "wire communication" as "any aural transfer made in whole or in part through the use of facilities for the
transmission of communications by the aid of wire, cable, or other like
connection between the point of origin and the point of reception... affecting interstate or foreign commerce." 16 1 The definition of
"aural transfer" is "a transfer containing the human voice at any point
16 2
between and including the point of origin and the point of reception."
Consequently, Magic Lantern would not be classified as a "wire communication" for the purposes of the ECPA, as it does not record the human
voice, but instead, only records keystrokes. 163 Because of the nature of
Magic Lantern, under the statute, it would not be classified as "Oral
Communication" because recording keystrokes would not likely be classi1 64
fied as "oral."
The remaining form of "communication" in the statute is "electronic
communication," and is likely the form of communication most applicable to Magic Lantern. "Electronic Communication" is defined as "any
be conducted.. (9) a statement of prior applications to intercept the same person,
place, or facility, including the action taken by the court for each application
[§ 2518(1)(e)]

Id.
156. 18 U.S.C. § 2518(1)(a-f); see Recent Case, supra n. 151.
157. 18 U.S.C. § 2518(3)(c); see Recent Case, supra n. 151.
158. See generally 18 U.S.C. § 2510.
159. See id.
160. Id. § 2511(1)(a).
161. Id. § 2510(1).
162. Id. § 2510(18).
163. Crocker, supra n. 13, at 'I 2.
164. Id. § 2510(2). "1[O0ral' communication" means any oral communication uttered by
a person exhibiting an expectation that such communication is not subject to interception
under circumstances justifying such expectation, but such term does not include any electronic communication." Id.; see U.S. v Carroll, 332 F Supp. 1299 (D.D.C. 1971).
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transfer of signs, signals, writing, images, sounds, data or intelligence of
any nature transmitted in whole or in part by a wire, radio, electromagnetic, photoelectronic or photooptical system that affects interstate or
foreign commerce[.]" 16 5 Without knowing the exact specifics of how and
when Magic Lantern records the keystrokes, it is difficult to tell whether
it will fall within the definition, but presumptively it could record keystrokes used in composing communications such as e-mail, instant messaging, electronic bulletin board posting, and online transactions, that
are transmitted via the Internet, thus brining it within the scope of Title
111.166 However, if Magic Lantern is configured so as not to record information traveling over the Internet, but only to record keystrokes made
"offline" (such as the KLS in Scarfo),16 7 then it would seem that law enforcement agencies and personnel would not need the authority granted
under Title I of the ECPA (dealing primarily with wiretaps) in order to
168
operate Magic Lantern.
For example, the court in Scarfo stated that "the F.B.I. did not install and operate any component which would search for and record data
entering or exiting the computer from the transmission pathway through
the modem attached to the computer[,]" because the "F.B.I. configured
the KLS to avoid intercepting electronic communications typed on the
keyboard and simultaneously transmitted in real time via the communication ports."1 69 This means that the KLS did not record keystrokes
while the modem operated. 1 70 Consequently, the court ruled that "the
KLS did not intercept any wire communications" and therefore did not
violate Title III, 18 U.S.C. § 2510 ("ECPA," "wiretap act," or "Title
III").171 However, the law is still very unclear in this area, and with only
one district court ruling on the subject matter, many other courts could
come to contrary holdings.
The distinction in Scarfo17 2 between online and offline communications could be moot, however, contingent on the courts interpretation of
"intercept" as defined in 18 U.S.C. § 2510(4): "'intercept' means the aural
or other acquisition of the contents of any wire, electronic or oral communication through the use of any electronic, mechanical, or other
173
device[.]"
The case law surrounding the interpretation of the word "intercep165.
166.
167.
168.
169.
170.
171.
172.
173.

18 U.S.C. § 2510(12).
Id. §§ 2510-2522.
See generally Scarfo, 180 F. Supp. 2d 572.
18 U.S.C. §§ 2510-2520.
Scarfo, 180 F. Supp. 2d at 581.
Id. at 582.
Id.
See generally id.
18 U.S.C. § 2510(4).
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tion" is unclear, conflicting, and contradictory at best.1 74 However, there
are some concurrences. 1 7 5 Although its function is less potent than
Magic Lantern's, the installation and use of a pen register has been held
not to be an "interception" under the definition of Title III, due principally to the fact that pen registers do not record content. 176 As previously stated, Magic Lantern would probably be found to record "content,"
unless otherwise configured and specified (i.e., the KLS in Scarfo177 ).
This is due mainly to the fact that, if Magic Lantern recorded every keystroke, then it would collect all letters turning into sentences, turning into
paragraphs, typed in word processing documents, e-mails, instant mes178
saging, etc.
A conflict of authority exists concerning whether an "interception"
must be made while the communication is in transit,or if an interception
can occur upon the seizure of communications that have previously been
in transit but currently are stored, or communications that are waiting
to be sent.179 The answer to this quagmire differs among the various
courts. 18

0

In Steve Jackson Games, Inc. v. United States Secret Service, 18 ' the
Fifth Circuit considered "whether the seizure of a computer on which is
stored private Email that has been sent to an electronic bulletin board,
but not yet read (retrieved) by the recipients, constitutes an "intercept"
proscribed by 18 U.S.C. § 2511(1)(a)[Title III]."182 The court held that
"Congress' use of the word 'transfer' in the definition of 'electronic communications', and its omission in that definition of the phrase 'any electronic storage of information'. . .reflects that Congress did not intend for
174. See generallyN.Y. Tel. 434 U.S. 159; Korman v. U.S., 486 F.2d 926 (7th Cir. 1973);
U.S. v. Ill. Bell Tel. Co. 531 F.2d 809 (7th Cir. 1976); U.S. v. Kai, 612 F.2d 443 (9th Cir.
1979).
175. Id.
176. Id.
177. See generally Scarfo, 180 F. Supp. 2d 572.
178. George Anastasia, Scarfo Case Could Test Cyber-spying Tactic, Inquirer T 5 (Jan.
6, 2002) (available at <http://philly.com/inquirer/2000/12/04/front page/jmoBo4.htm?template+aprint.html>).
179. See generally Konop v. HawaiianAirlines, Inc., 236 F.3d 1035 (9th Cir. 2001), opinion withdrawn by Konop v. HawaiianAirlines, Inc., 262 F.3d 972 (9th Cir. 2001) (holding
that electronic communications in transit and in storage should be treated equally for the
purposes of defining "interception" according to the ECPA).
180. Id.
181. 36 F.3d 457 (5th Cir. 1994).
182. Id. at 460. In Steve Jackson, plaintiff "operated from one of its computers an electronic bulletin board system. . ." Id. The United States Secret Service, in an attempt to
recover information, seized Jackson's computers that contained information that the Secret
Service was seeking. Id. Jackson then sued claiming the Secret Service violated, among
others, the Federal Wiretap Act (18 U.S.C. §§ 2510 et seq.) and the Stored Communications Act (18 U.S.C. § 2701 et seq.). Id.
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'intercept' to apply to 'electronic communications' when those communications are in 'electronic storage."'1 8 3 The court held that Title II of the
ECPA, instead of Title I, should govern electronic communications intercepted in electronic storage. 1 8 4 Some courts have followed the rationale
in Steve Jackson,l8 5 while other courts have come to contrary

decisions. 186
The definition of "intercept" could prove to be crucial to the treatment of Magic Lantern, particularly if the recording of keystrokes does
not qualify as accessing "stored communications" "without authorization
a facility through which an electronic communication service is provided;
or (2) [if the recording of keystrokes] intentionally exceeds an authorization to access that facility; and thereby obtains, alters, or prevents authorized access to a wire or electronic communication while it is in
electronic storage."18 7 This outcome seems probable, taking into account
that the statute was created to provide "both criminal sanctions and a
civil right of action against persons who gain unauthorized access to
communications facilities and thereby access electronic communications
stored incident to their transmission." 8 8 The language of the statute
also indicates that Title II of the ECPA will not govern Magic Lantern
because Magic Lantern is installed on a personal computer, not "a facility through which an electronic communication service is provided" such
18 9
as an ISP.
In the case In re DoubleClick Inc. Privacy Litigation,19 0 the district
court found that software known as "cookies", which is implanted on a
target's hard drive and collect information "such as usernames, passwords, and preferences," a technology not unsimilar to Magic Lantern, is
not governed under Title II based on the "temporary" language used in
183. Id. at 461-62.
184. Id. at 462-63.
185. See generally U.S. v. Reyes, 922 F.Supp. 818 (S.D.N.Y. 1996) (holding that retrieval
of numbers from the memory of a pager is not an "interception" within the meaning of the
ECPA). The court in Reyes stated that "intercepting an electronic communication essentially means acquiring the transfer of data... the definitions [provided in 18 U.S.C. 2510]
thus imply a requirement that the acquisition of the data be simultaneous with the original
transmission of the data." Id. at 836. The court went on to state "[c]onsequently, in retrieving numbers from the pagers memories, the agents in this case access stored electronic
communications. The accessing of stored electronic communications is governed by Title II
of the ECPA, 18 U.S.C. § 2701 et seq." Id. at 837.
186. See generally Konop, 236 F.3d 1035 (9th Cir. 2001) (opinion withdrawn by Konop,
262 F.3d 972).
187. 18 U.S.C. § 2701.
188. DoubleClick, 154 F. Supp. 2d at 507.
189. 18 U.S.C. § 2701.
190. 154 F. Supp. 2d 497 (2001).
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defining "electronic storage" 19 1 under the ECPA.19 2 The court in
DoubleClick held that the section defining "electronic storage" "is specifically targeted at communications temporarily stored by electronic communications services incident to their transmission." 193 This means that,
according to the court's holding, the statute is directed towards ISP's
that store their client's communications temporarily as they are routed
through the system.' 9 4 The decision only provides further support for
the contention that Title II of the ECPA will not govern Magic
19 5
Lantern.
Therefore, analysis of the applicability of the ElectronicCommunications Privacy Act 196 to the use of Magic Lantern is as follows: Magic Lantern's use must first be deemed an "interception" of "electronic
communication." 197 It is likely that Magic Lantern will meet the "acquisition" requirement because it records data, as well as, and for the same
reason, the requirement that the interception be done "through the use
of any electronic, mechanical, or other device." 198 However, it seems
that the determination of whether keystrokes will be deemed "electronic
communication" will depend on the specifications and configuration of
Magic Lantern, specifications which are largely heretofore unrevealed,
as well as judicial interpretation of the statute's definition. 199 Assuming, arguendo, that keystrokes are deemed electronic communication, the
use of Magic Lantern would then require clearance through the rigorous
authorization process outlined in Title I of the ECPA, 20 0 and analysis of
any challenges to Magic Lantern's use would have to be on a case-by-case
basis since the amount of information collected could possibly vary. 20 1
However, if Magic Lantern's use is not found to be one of "interception"
under Title I of the ECPA,2 02 it is additionally unlikely that Title II of
the ECPA will govern its use.2 0 3 The language of the statute does not
apply to individual users, whereas the use of Magic Lantern does exactly
191.

18 U.S.C. § 2510(17) (defining "electronic storage" as "(A) any temporary, interme-

diate storage of a wire or electronic communication incidental to the electronic transmission thereof; and (B) any storage of such communication by an electronic communication
service for purposes of backup protection of such communication").

192.
193.
194.
195.
196.
197.
198.
199.
200.
201.
202.
203.

DoubleClick, 154 F. Supp. 2d at 511-12.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 512.
18 U.S.C. §§ 2510-2522, 2701-2709.
Id. §§ 2510(4)-(12).
Id.
See supra nn. 120-125 and accompanying text.
18 U.S.C. §§ 2510-2522.
See supra nn. 113-117 and accompanying text.
18 U.S.C. §§ 2510-2522.
See supra nn. 140-145 and accompanying text.
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that. 20 4 Ultimately, unless Congress acts to extend the reach of the
ECPA, Magic Lantern's use will probably not be governed under the
ECPA at all, due to the strong implication in the language of the statute
that it was drafted primarily for technologies more akin to "Carnivore," a
technology capable of intercepting communications similar to those in20 5
tercepted by a traditional wiretap.
B.

FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE SURVEILLANCE

ACT OF

1978206

In light of recent acts of foreign and domestic terrorism, perhaps the
most significant piece of legislation that could potentially authorize and
govern much of the use of Magic Lantern is the FISA. 20 7 FISA, enacted
in 1978 in response to "public concern about executive wiretaps," created
and outlined "standards for obtaining a court order authorizing foreign
intelligence electronic surveillance." 20 8 Specifically, FISA "authorizes
the issuance of secret wiretap orders" for foreign intelligence information
"upon a judicial finding of probable cause to believe that the subject of
the order is a foreign power or an agent of a foreign power."20 9 No court
order is required for authorization under FISA if no United States person is likely to be overheard in the surveillance, "only certification by the
Attorney General. If a United States person is involved, however, FISA
requires an order issued by a special foreign intelligence surveillance
court. A judge [on the] court must approve the electronic surveillance
2 10
if ...the requirements of the statute have been satisfied."
204. 18 U.S.C. § 270. Sullivan, supra n. 10, at
14; Lemos, supra n. 20, at 16. "'If
Magic Lantern is as described, then it is a rifle-shot attack on a suspect'.. .compared with
Carnivore's shotgun blast." Id.
205. See 18 U.S.C. § 2510. The statute continually makes use of the word "transmitted"
and "transmission", indicating a wiretap/Carnivore technology that intercepts communications in "transit" over the internet or a wire, not keystrokes made on an individuals keyboard. Id. § 2510(12) (17).
206. 50 U.S.C.A. §§1801-1863 (1994 & Supp. V 1999).
207. Id.
208. Brian H. Redmond, Validity, Construction, and Application of Foreign Intelligence
Surveillance Act of 1978 (50 U.S.CA. §§ 1801 et. seq.) Authorizing Electronic Surveillance
of Foreign Powers and Their Agents, 86 A.L.R. Fed. 782, 788 (1988).
209. Marc Roth, Subpoenas, Search Warrants and Surveillance Orders-Coming to an
ISP Near You? 18 No. 7 E-Commerce 1; see 50 U.S.C.A. §§ 1801, 1802 (1994 & Supp. V
1999).
210. Motta, supra n. 69, at 664. FISA created a Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court
on which seven United States District Court judges, selected by the Chief Justice of the
United States, sit.
The order must specify the identity or provide a description of the target of the
electronic surveillance, the nature and location of each facility or place at which
electronic surveillance will be effected and whether physical entry will be used to
effect the surveillance, the period of time during which the electronic surveillance
is approved and when more than one surveillance devise is used under the order,
the authorized coverage of each device and the minimization procedures to be ap-
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In order for FISA to be deemed applicable, Magic Lantern must first
meet the statute's definition of "electronic surveillance." 2 11 Although
FISA provides several circumstances that would qualify as "electronic
surveillance," the definition that will more than likely apply to Magic
Lantern is 50 U.S.C. § 1801(f(4). This definition provides that electronic
surveillance is the:
installation or use of an electronic, mechanical, or other surveillance
device in the United States for monitoring to acquire information, other
than from a wire or radio communication, under circumstances in which
a person has a reasonable expectation 2of
privacy and a warrant would
12
be required for enforcement purposes.
Magic Lantern is a surveillance device used to record keystrokes,
thus falling under the first part of FISA's definition. 2 13 Additionally, unless otherwise notified of the Trojan/virus that was secretly installed into
the hard drive, it seems manifest that one would have a reasonable expectation of privacy in the keystrokes entered into his or her computer. 2 14 Moreover, as demonstrated in Scarfo,2 15 keystroke logging is
the kind of activity for which "a warrant would be required for law enforcement purposes." 2 16 Consequently, it seems likely that the use of
Magic Lantern will meet both the traditional and legal definition of "electronic surveillance."
The use of Magic Lantern will also have to meet the minimization
requirements and procedures laid out in 50 U.S.C. § 1801(f). 2 17 The
statute mandates specific procedures that must be followed in order to
minimize any disruption and damage the surveillance may cause. 2 18 For
plied. The order also must direct that the minimization procedures be followed
and may direct third parties to furnish law enforcement authorities with necessary information, facilities, or technical assistance necessary to accomplish the
electronic surveillance in a manner that will protect its secrecy and interfere minimally with the services of the subject of that order.
Id. at 664-65.
211. 50 U.S.C. § 1801(f)(4).
212. Id.
213. See generally Sullivan, supra n. 10.
214. See supra Part II and accompanying text (discussing an individual's reasonable
expectation of privacy).
215. Scarfo, 180 F. Supp. 2d at 578-80.
216. 50 U.S.C. § 1801(f)(4); see Scarfo, F. Supp. 2d at 574. The FBI obtained two search
warrants to install the KLS on Scarfo's computer. Id.
217. Id.
218. 50 U.S.C. § 1801(h).
"Minimization procedures", with respect to electronic surveillance, means(1) specific procedures, which shall be adopted by the Attorney General, that are
reasonably designed in light of the purpose and technique of the particular surveillance, to minimize the acquisition and retention, and prohibit the dissemination,
of nonpublicly available information concerning unconsenting United States persons consistent with the need of the United States to obtain, produce, and disseminate foreign intelligence information; (2) procedures that require that nonpublicly
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example, given that Magic Lantern is a computer program whose source
code is capable of being edited if necessary to perform, or quit performing, certain functions, it would appear that the use of Magic Lantern
could be altered as needed to comply with the minimization
2 19
procedures.
FISA's significance and importance to Magic Lantern lie in the ease
of which authorization is obtained for electronic surveillance under the
statute. 220 "Because the governmental interest in gathering intelligence
information is different from that of a criminal investigation," 22 1 the prerequisites required for authorization of electronic surveillance under
FISA contain a much lower burden of proof and thus are much easier to
obtain than that required for the issuance of a warrant or wiretap in a
criminal investigation. 2 22 FISA authorization requires
that the FISA Judge find probable cause to believe that the target is a
foreign power or an agent of a foreign power, and that the place at
which the electronic surveillance is to be directed is being used or is
about to be used by a foreign power or an agent of a foreign power; and
it requires him to find that the application meets the requirements of
3
the Act.

22

The relaxed burden of proof required to obtain authorization for suravailable information, which is not foreign intelligence information, as defined in
subsection (e)(1) of this section, shall not be disseminated in a manner that identifies any United States person, without such person's consent, unless such person's
identity is necessary to understand foreign intelligence information or assess its
importance; (3) notwithstanding paragraphs (1) and (2), procedures that allow for
the retention and dissemination of information that is evidence of a crime which
has been, is being, or is about to be committed and that is to be retained or disseminated for law enforcement purposes; and (4) notwithstanding paragraphs (1), (2),
and (3), with respect to any electronic surveillance approved pursuant to section
1802(a) of this title, procedures that require that no contents of any communication to which a United States person is a party shall be disclosed, disseminated, or
used for any purpose or retained for longer than twenty-four hours unless a court
order under section 1805 of this title is obtained or unless the Attorney General
determines that the information indicates a threat of death or serious bodily harm
to any person.
Id.

219. Id.
220. Id. §§ 1801-1805.
221. Redmond, supra n. 208, § 3[b].
222. Id. (citing U.S. v.Dugan, 743 F.2d 59 (N.Y. 1984)). Duggan held that "given the
differences between ordinary criminal investigations and foreign counterintelligence investigations, the adoption in [FISA] of prerequisites to surveillance that are less stringent
than those precedent to the issuance of a warrant for a criminal investigation is reasona-

ble." Id.
223. Dugan, 743 F.2d at 73. The court in Duggan stated "We conclude that these requirements provide an appropriate balance between the individual's interest in privacy
and the government's need to obtain foreign intelligence information, and that FISA does
not violate the probable cause requirement of the Fourth Amendment." Id. at 74.
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veillance under FISA22 4 takes on even more importance for Magic Lantern when viewed in light of the recent passage of the USA PATRIOT
Act 2 2 5 , a statute that significantly broadened the surveillance power of
the national government by modifying numerous existing statutes including FISA.2 26 Specifically pertaining to the use of Magic Lantern
under FISA, the USA PATRIOT Act relaxed the authorization requirement by stating that the purpose of obtaining "foreign intelligence information" need not be the entire reason for the surveillance, but only a
"significant purpose." 22 7 This amendment of the threshold requirement
seems to indicate that Congress is now more willing to accept, and perhaps encourage, the use of governmental surveillance for anti-terrorism
and intelligence warfare purposes. 2 28 This acquiescence to governmental electronic surveillance combined with FISA's likely application to
Magic Lantern would seemingly give the FBI a great amount of leeway
in choosing its targets, obtaining authorization for the use of Magic Lantern, and recording keystrokes that could potentially reveal more infor2 29
mation than was specified in the authorization order.
C.

ADDITIONAL STATUTES POSSIBLY AFFECTING THE USE OF MAGIC

LANTERN:

USA PATRIOT ACT,

THE PRIVACY PROTECTION ACT, AND THE

COMPUTER FRAUD AND ABUSE ACT.

Although the web of interweaving laws that could conceivably apply
to the use of Magic Lantern is vast and of varying consequence, a brief
analysis of the USA PATRIOT Act, 230 the Privacy Protection Act
("PPA"), 2 3 1 and the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act ("CFAA")2 3 2 helps
demonstrate the applicability of statutory law on Magic Lantern.
1.

The USA PATRIOT Act

As previously discussed, the USA PATRIOT Act, passed mainly in
response to the recent terrorist attacks, 23 3 significantly modifies current
government surveillance law. 23 4 In addition to loosening the restrictions
required to obtain authorization for surveillance under FISA, the Act
224. 50 U.S.C. §§ 1801-1863.
225. U.S.A.PATRIOT Act, Pub. L. No., 107-56, 2001 HR 3162, §§ 206-208, 218.
226. Id.
227. Id. § 218.
228. Id.
229. Id.
230. Id.
231. 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000aa (2001).
232. 18 U.S.C.A. § 1030.
233. Bret A. Fausett, Webtechniques, Becoming a Patriot 10 <http://www.webtechnique.com> (Feb. 2002).
234. See supra nn. 169, 170 and accompanying text.
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makes terrorism an action for which a wiretap may be authorized under
Title III (ECPA, Wiretap Act).2 3 5 The Act also specifically authorizes the
use of the FBI's "other" electronic surveillance tool Carnivore, 23 6 authorizes additional sharing between information law-enforcement and national security agencies of surveillance intelligence, 2 3 7 expands
governmental surveillance duration limits, 238 authorizes "sneak and
peek" warrants, 2 39 and leaves most of these provisions intact even after
the "sunset" clause in the Act terminates many other provisions. 240 Although the passage of the USA PATRIOT Act mainly affects the use of
Magic Lantern indirectly, as previously discussed, the Act represents a
liberal trend in Congress and serves to both allow and encourage the
24 1
development and use of governmental surveillance technologies.
Thus, every challenge to governmental surveillance, and, more specifically, challenges to the use of Magic Lantern made while these statutes
remain in effect will occur against the backdrop of a government providing leniency to surveillance technologies.
2.

The Privacy ProtectionAct

The PPA242 could prove to complicate the use of Magic Lantern, contingent on how the courts interpret the language of the statute as it applies to "keystroke logging" as opposed to a more traditional "seizure"
under the Fourth Amendment. 2 43 "The [PPA] ensures publishers' First
Amendment rights of freedom of the press by establishing that government seizure of publishers' 'work product materials' is a criminal offense
unless there is a probable cause to believe that the person possessing
such materials is committing the offense to which the materials relate."24 4 Specifically, the Act prohibits any government officer, while investigating or prosecuting a criminal offense, to "search for or seize any
work product materials possessed by a person reasonably believed to
have a purpose to disseminate to the public a newspaper, book broadcast,
235. See Young, supran. 154, at 1058 (citing U.S.A. PATRIOTAct, Pub. L. No. 107-56,
115 Stat. 272, § 201 (amending 18 U.S.C. 2516(1)).
236. See id. (citingU.S.A. PATRIOT Act, Pub. L. No. 107-56, 115 Stat. 272, § 214, 216
(amending 50 U.S.C. §§ 1842, 1843; 18 U.S.C. §§ 3121,3123,3127)).
237. See id. (citing U.S.A PARTIOT Act, Pub. L. No. 107-56, 115 Stat. 272, § 203(b)-(d)
(amending 18 U.S.C. § 2510, 2517)).
238. See id. (citing U.S.A. PATRIOT Act, Pub. L. No. 107-56, 115 Stat. 272, § 207
(amending 50 U.S.C. §§ 1805, 1824)).
239. See id. (citing U.S.A. PATRIOT Act, Pub. L. No. 107-56, 115 Stat. 272, § 213
(amending 18 U.S.C. § 3103a)).
240. See id. (citing U.S.A. PATRIOT Act, Pub. L. No. 107-56, 115 Stat. 272, § 224).
241. See supra nn. 237-241 and accompanying text.
242. 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000aa.
243. U.S. Const. amend. IV.
244. Gindin, supra n. 149, at 1203.
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or other similar form of public communication [."245 Although it is axiomatic that the communications composed electronically and, consequently typed on a keyboard, can be "published" to the public via the
Internet (Web pages, bulletin boards, etc.), 2 4 6 it is unclear whether keystrokes will fall into the definition of "work product materials" or "documentary materials," both of which refer to actual materials or in the case
of electronic communication, "magnetically or electronically" stored
materials. 2 47 Since Magic Lantern presumably only records actions such
as keystrokes and does not collect actual materials stored electronically
or magnetically, then the PPA will apply to the use of Magic Lantern
only if the courts find that Magic Lantern "constructively" seizes information that would later (when the work that the keystrokes made up
were saved on a hard drive or communicated via the Internet) qualify as
"work product materials" or "documentary materials."2 48 If this rationale is carried out in the courts, then the use of Magic Lantern will have
to fit into one of the exceptions provided for in the PPA,2 49 or alternatively only intercept passwords and like keystrokes that by their very
nature are generally not published to the public. Of course, these challenges must be handled on a case-by-case basis, and given the political
support for governmental surveillance, 250 Magic Lantern will probably
2 51
fall outside the range of the PPA.

245. 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000aa(a).
246. Gindin, supra n. 149, at 1204. "[Alnyone posting messages on the Internet or online services can be considered a 'publisher.'" Id.
247. 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000aa-7(a) (b) reads:
'Documentary materials,' as used in this chapter, means materials upon which
information is recorded, and includes, but is not limited to, written or printed
materials, photographs, motion picture films, negatives, video tapes, audio tapes,
and other mechanically, magnetically or electronically recorded cards, tapes, or
discs, but does not include contraband or the fruits of a crime or things otherwise
criminally possessed, or property designed or intended for use, or which is or has
been used as, the means of committing a criminal offense. (b) 'Work product
materials,' as used in this chapter, means materials, other than contraband or the
fruits of a crime or things otherwise criminally possessed, or property designed or
intended for use, or which is or has been used, as the means of committing a criminal offense, and- (1) in anticipation of communicating such materials to the public, are prepared, produced, authored, or created, whether by the person in
possession of the materials or by any other person; (2) are possessed for the purposes of communicating such materials to the public; and (3) include mental impressions, conclusions, opinions, or theories of the person who prepared, produced,
authored, or created such material.
Id.
248. Id.
249. See id.
250. See supra part III.C.1 (concerning the recent passage of the USA PATRIOT Act).
251. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000aa.
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The Computer Fraud and Abuse Act

The Computer Fraud and Abuse Act ("CFAA")2 5 2 is "primarily intended to prevent unauthorized access to computer networks to protect
the privacy of communications associated with those networks." 25 3 Although the statute lies on the fringe affecting the use of Magic Lantern,
it will be of particular importance if the Magic Lantern technology is intercepted and used by a hacker seeking to conform the FBI's snoop
software for his or her own benefit by accessing a computer prohibited by
25 4
the statute.
4. The Usual Suspects?
In addition to the aforementioned statutes, Magic Lantern will also
be subject to the same "informational privacy" based statues by which
many other surveillance technologies are governed, specifically the Privacy Act 25 5 and the Freedom of Information Act ("FOIA"). 25 6 If Magic
Lantern records more than mere passwords, these acts will probably require disclosure of particular information kept by the FBI and obtained
through the technology's use. 2 5 7 Magic Lantern does not deviate far
from other surveillance technologies concerning its application to these
2 58
two statutes.
However, not all statutes that affect governmental surveillance will
be deemed applicable to Magic Lantern because the technology clearly
does not fall under the language of these statutes. For example, the
CommunicationsAssistance for Law Enforcement Act ("CALEA"), 2 59 as it
applies only to ISPs by imposing upon them an obligation to "ensure
their networks are sufficiently accessible to law enforcement. Note that
CALEA has no effect on law enforcement's ability to obtain a court order,
such as a search warrant... it simply defines the scope of obligation to
telecommunications carriers to make technical changes to their networks to accommodate surveillance." 260 So although the statute proves
252. 18 U.S.C. § 1030.
253. Edward Fenno, FederalInternet Privacy Law, 12-Feb S.C. Law. 36, 41 (2001) (citing 18 U.S.C. § 1030 (2001)).
254. 18 U.S.C. § 1030.
255. 5 U.S.C.A. § 552a (2001).
256. Id.
257. Gindin, supra n. 149, at 1203. "The Privacy Act of 1974 is the primary statute
governing the federal government's acquisition and use of federal agency records containing personal information. The act prohibits disclosure of a record without the written consent of the subject of the record except under certain circumstances." Id. at 1204.
258. See 5 U.S.C. § 552a.
259. 47 U.S.C.A. §§ 1001-10 (2001).
260. Donna N Lampert, Internet Privacy:An Overview of Domestic and International
Issue and Policy Responses, 597 PLI/PAT 357, 365 (2000).
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beneficial for surveillance technologies, such as "Carnivore," that require
the assistance of an ISP for "wiretapping," CALEA demonstrates well
the numerous laws that Magic Lantern will bypass due to the fact that
the surveillance needs no direct assistance from a communications
261
carrier.
IV.

THE PRACTICAL APPLICATION AND DILEMMAS OF MAGIC
LANTERN, AND THE RAMIFICATIONS OF ITS USE.

Although it appears that the use of Magic Lantern, with the proper
authorization, will be within the proper boundaries of the law, the practi2 62
cal application of the technology will probably be much more difficult.
The technology faces serious conflict with anti-virus software programs
and foreign governments. 26 3 However, many critics argue that the
software is a better alternative than the previous software snoop, "Carnivore," and the proposed "national key escrow" to combat criminals that
264
encrypt their communication.
A.

THE ANTI-vIRUS DILEMMA

After Magic Lantern jumps the legal hurdles and barriers to the authorization of its use and once the FBI sends it, the Trojan must remain
hidden on the target's computer in order to be effective. 26 5 Consequently, the use of Magic Lantern will be greatly hindered if not made
altogether futile, unless anti-virus software developers acquiesce to the
use of the trojan and design their software programs to "look over" the
infecting file, or perhaps, alternatively, abstain from designing the
26 6
software to "find" the file.
Mixed reports abound concerning whether the anti-virus software
26 7
"Major antidevelopers are going to cooperate with the government.
virus vendors [have said] that they would not voluntarily cooperate with
the FBI and said their products would continue to be updated to detect
and prevent viruses, regardless of their origin, unless there was a legal
order otherwise." 2 68 The software vendors state that "looking over" the
virus would "anger U.S. customers and alienate non-U.S. customers and
governments." 2 69 Contrary to some reports, 2 70 and at the release of this
article, the general sentiment of the anti-virus industry appears to be
261.
262.
263.
264.
265.
266.
267.
268.
269.

47 U.S.C.A. §§ 1001-10.
See supra nn. 237-242, and accompanying text.
Crocker, supra n. 13, at $ 4.
See generally Lemos, supra n. 20; Sullivan, supra n. 10, at [ 1, 12.
See generally Sullivan, supra n. 10.
Id.
Id.
MSNBC, FBI Confirms, supra n. 5, at 8.
Id. at 9.
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that vendors are "in the business of providing a virus-free environment
for [their] users and [they are] not going to do anything to compromise
27 1
that security."
The conflict becomes more complicated considering that "for antivirus vendors to know which Trojan horse to 'overlook', the FBI would
need to provide a sample of the code. For security reasons, it is unlikely
that this would happen."27 2 The technology could be adapted without
authorization and used illegally by hackers. 27 3 In addition, "[i]f anti-virus vendors were to leave a hole for an FBI-created Trojan horse program, malicious hackers would try to exploit the hole too... [ilf you leave
the weakness for the FBI, you leave it for everybody." 27 4 Additionally,
there is a question regarding "how... vendors [will] know which code is
written by the FBI and which originates from virus authors with a chip
27 5
on their shoulder[.]"
An additional problem could be the precedent set if the anti-virus
companies "ignore" Magic Lantern. Although the FBI is the only governmental agency to announce publicly its need for such cooperation from
the anti-virus vendors, how will the vendors respond when other agencies (such as the CIA and NSA) request their cooperation? Many critics
of the technology argue that "[tihe government would have to convince
all anti-virus vendors to cooperate or the plan wouldn't work, since those
not cooperating would have a market advantage and since they all share
information."2 76 The anti-virus vendors face "an impossible dilemma: if
they do not comply with the FBI, they appear unpatriotic; if they do com277
ply, they risk a catastrophic loss of business."
B.

THE FOREIGN GOVERNMENT DILEMMA

The use of Magic Lantern and its conflict with foreign governments
could also cause conflict with those governments. "It is likely that the
governments of other nations would want protection against anything
like Magic Lantern" via the anti-virus vendors. 2 78 What if other law enforcement agencies from other countries developed technologies similar
270. See generally Robert Vamosi, MSNBC.com, We Know What You're Typing <http:l!
www.msnbc.com/news/669010.asp> (Dec. 7, 2001).
271. Elinor Mills Abreu, USA: Antivirus firms say they won't create FBI Loophole
Reuters English News Service 6 (Dec. 10, 2001) (available in WL 12/10/01 Reuters Eng.
News Serv. 20:24:00).
272. BugWatch: Magic Lantern- Not Magic and Not Very Bright VNU Newswire
6
(Dec. 17, 2001) (available in 2001 WL 7311550) [hereinafter Bug Watch].
273. Id.
274. Abreu, supra n. 271, at
8, 9.
275. BugWatch, supra n. 272, at f 7.
276. Abreu, supra n. 271, at 11.
277. Crocker, supra n. 13, at 4.
278. See generally BugWatch, supra n. 272.
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to Magic Lantern? How would the United States government and antivirus vendors react to a request to accommodate them?
Another diplomatic problem related to Magic Lantern and the antivirus dilemma relates to the impression presented if the anti-virus vendors, with sales world wide, accommodate a spy tool of the United States
government. 27 9 For example, "[i]f (the Chinese) thought that the company was a tool of the CIA [or in this case the FBI], China would stop
using [the anti-virus products that comply with U.S. governmental re28 0
quests] in critical environments."
C.

THE PROPONENTS ANSWER

Although Magic Lantern has drawn strong criticism, 28 1 those in
favor of the technology feel that, in this era of informational warfare,
Magic Lantern is a much more suitable technology for both security concerns and civil rights than previous surveillance technologies. 28 2 U.S.
Rep. Richard Armey has been cited supporting the technology. "The way
we look at it, this may be better than other available tools... Where the
Carnivore system... has access to an entire data stream and could potentially spy on any traffic on that network, the so-called 'Magic Lantern'
technology would only be installed on a single PC." 28 3 A spokesman for
Armey stated that "if Magic Lantern is as described, then it is a rifle-shot
28 4
attack on a suspect, compared with Carnivore's shotgun blast."
Magic Lantern advocates also argue that the technology is a much
more pragmatic and suitable alternative to the proposed "national key
escrow." 28 5 The National Key Escrow system is one that would entrust
all of the keys to unlock any encryption in a third party escrow, with the
U.S. government owning the "master key," and consequently having
"backdoor access to all encryption products made in the United
States."286 The logic behind this argument is that both the government
and private citizens are better off giving the government authority to use
Magic Lantern only on individuals for which they can obtain the proper
authorization, as opposed to giving the government the "master key"
that would allow them to decrypt every cipher message sent within the
28 7
United States.
279. See generally Abreu, supra n. 271.
280. Id. at 14.
281. See generally BugWatch, supra n. 272.
282. See generally Lemos, supra n. 20.
283. Id.
284. Id.
285. Sullivan, supra n. 10, at 12.
286. Brian Fonseca, CNN.com, Fears Rekindle Key Escrow Debates 3 <http://www.
cnn.com/200liTECHIinternet/10/23/escrow.debate.idglindex.html> (Oct. 23, 2001).
287. Sullivan, supra n. 10, at IT 13, 14.
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CONCLUSION

Magic Lantern, the FBI's electronic keystroke logger that is implanted via the Internet, is being introduced as a legally undeveloped
surveillance technology into an uncertain and dynamic legal landscape.
Although the technology has drawn criticism from many who claim the
technology is a violation of privacy rights, the recent terrorist attacks
have shifted government attitudes concerning electronic surveillance
and altered the landscape in which any challenge to surveillance technology will be evaluated. 28 8 Purportedly used primarily to collect passwords needed to break encrypted messages which have historically been
a problem for the FBI, the technology is reported to arrive via e-mail in
the form of a Trojan horse or worm that installs itself secretly on the
target's computer, records some or all keystrokes made, and supposedly
28 9
transmits the information back to the FBI.
In order to determine what authorization, if any, will be required for
the use of Magic Lantern, both Constitutional and statutory determinations must be made. Using the "reasonable expectation of privacy" test
developed in Katz, 29 0 it is likely that the use of Magic Lantern, and the
consequent recording of keystrokes entered into a Personal Computer,
will be considered a search and seizure under the Fourth Amendment 2 9 1,
as it is axiomatic that many of the keystrokes which are recorded would
be made, initially, with an expectation of privacy. 29 2 This determination
would, at the very least, require a search warrant in order to utilize
Magic Lantern on a specific target. 293 Additionally, use of the key logging technology would have to pass Constitutional standards prohibiting
the use of a general warrant. 29 4 Considering the fact that the software
can be modified to conform to constitutional standards, and that search
warrants my be written with specificity, it is likely that Magic Lantern
can be utilized without violating the general warrant prohibition in the
29 5
Constitution.
An additional burden will be placed on the use of Magic Lantern if
such use is found to fall within the regulation of the Electronic Commu29 7
nications Privacy Act, 2 9 6 or the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act.
288. William Matthew, Federal Computer Week, Security Trumps Privacy in New Order 4 <http://www.fcw.compcw/articlesl2001/0924/pol-security-09-24-01.asp> (Sept. 24,
2001).
289. Crocker, supra n. 13, at J 2.
290. Katz, 389 U.S. 347.
291. U.S. Const. amend. IV.
292. See generally Katz, 389 U.S. 347.
293. Scarfo, 180 F. Supp. 2d at 576.
294. Id. at 577.
295. Id.
296. 18 U.S.C. § 2510-2522, 2701-2709.
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If the ECPA is deemed applicable to Magic Lantern's use, then authorization for a wiretap must be obtained before the technology is deployed
on a target.298 The burden for obtaining authorization under FISA is
significantly less, however, requiring that "a significant2 99purpose" of the
investigation must be for foreign intelligence purposes.
Whether Magic Lantern will be governed by the ECPA30 0 will depend on whether courts interpret keystrokes as "electronic communications" and Magic Lantern's recording of those keystrokes as an
"interception" under the definition of the statute. 3 0 1 It might be possible
for some courts to reach the conclusion that the ECPA's definitions were
meant to include the use of Magic Lantern because it "constructively intercepts" electronic communications by recording data that could later
make up the content of an e-mail or other communication traveling
through an ISP. 30 2 It is more likely, however, that Magic Lantern will
be deemed not to fall within the reach of the ECPA, as the language of
the statute is geared toward surveillance technologies similar to the
FBI's "Carnivore" and is much more difficult to apply to the recording of
30 3
keystrokes.
If the FBI seeks to deploy Magic Lantern for purposes of Foreign
Intelligence, then such use will most likely require authorization under
FISA. 30 4 However, the burden is very low and requires only a showing
probable cause the target is a foreign power or agent of a foreign
power. 30 5 It is likely, therefore, that FISA will be a significant source for
the authorization of Magic Lantern's use, as many recent security and
surveillance concerns focus on international information. 30 6 Magic Lantern will also have to comply with the Privacy Act 30 7 and Freedom of
InformationAct, as do the other surveillance technologies.
The legal future of Magic Lantern rests in the hands of Congress
and the courts. In this age of information warfare, such technologies can
prove to be invaluable in thwarting those that use technology to cause
unthinkable disasters and tragedy. But the coexisting values of security
and privacy require balance, and as one increases, the other, by nature,
decreases. The question then turns on which value is more necessary.
297. 50 U.S.C. § 1801(f)(4)
298. Reyes, 922 F. Supp. at 836.
299. Roth, supra n. 209, §8 Pre-Patriot Act, Wiretap and Electronic Surveilance
Statutes.
300. Scarfo, 180 F. Supp. 2d at 581.
301. See generally 18 U.S.C. § 2510.
302. See id.
303. See id.
304. Dugan, 743 F.2d at 73.
305. 50 U.S.C.A. §§ 1801-1863 (1994 & Supp. V 1999).
306. Redmond, supra n. 209, at 788.
307. 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000aa-7(a)(b).
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Magic Lantern has the potential to be a functional security safeguard,
and with that comes the potential for great abuse. In order to maintain
the balance between privacy and security, enough safeguards must be
put into place to ensure Constitutional and statutory compliance while
maintaining the utility, or "Magic," of Magic Lantern.
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